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The Elasticity of Taxable Income during the 1990s: Further Explorations
Abstract
This paper presents applications of variants of a differencing methodology to Internal
Revenue Service tax records in order to estimate taxable income elasticities for the 1990s.
Estimates are systematically examined by applying a number of sensitivity tests. Estimates are
produced after altering the: (1) time interval over which observational-level behavior is
measured; (2) income restrictions on the sample; (3) choice of control variables; and (4)
weighting scheme used in the regressions. In general, estimates are quite sensitive to a
number of different factors. In contrast to some of the literature, estimates are larger when
behavior is measured over 3-year intervals as opposed to over 1-year intervals, suggesting
small transitory responses to tax changes but larger longer-term responses. When including
the richest set of income controls, income-weighted short-term elasticity estimates (based on
1-year differencing) range from 0 to 0.19. Similarly estimated longer-term elasticities (where
data are differenced over 3-year intervals) are about 0.32. When adding adjacent year tax rates
to the model, short-term elasticity estimates range from 0.30 to 0.43 and longer-term
estimates from 0.97 to 1.37. In most cases, estimates from an end-year approach (which
includes only 2 years of data, one well before the tax change and one well after) are not
statistically different from 0. However, even for the approaches that produce statistically
significant results, estimates are sensitive to an array of factors and plausible sensitivity
checks often result in estimates that differ greatly. A major conclusion is that isolating the true
taxable income responses to tax changes is inherently complex and little confidence should be
placed on any single estimate.
JEL Codes: H2, H21, H31, and J22
The author thanks David Weiner, Ed Harris, Bob Dennis, Doug Hamilton, Tom Woodward,
and Emmanuel Saez for comments and for assistance with the construction of the data.
3I. Introduction
This paper is the third in a series describing estimates of the elasticity of taxable income with a
focus on the sensitivity of these estimates to an array of factors (see Giertz 2006 and 2008). The
paper revisits the 1990s tax increases using panels constructed from Internal Revenue Service tax
return data for 1988–95 from the Statistics of Income (SOI). These data heavily oversample
high-income filers, who, research suggests, play a critical role in determining overall responses
to changes in tax rates (Navratil 1995; Moffitt and Wilhelm 2000; Gruber and Saez 2002; and
Saez 2004).
This paper makes several contributions to the recent literature. It offers estimates of new
elasticities for the 1990s. These estimates are systematically examined by applying a wide array
of sensitivity tests. The estimates are produced using different regression weights (i.e.,
unweighted versus income-weighted) and alternative sample income restrictions. Furthermore, in
order to examine the effect of income controls on estimates, six different specifications are run
using different intervals (1-, 3-, and 6-year differences) for the measurement of (observation-
level) behavior.
In general, income-weighted estimates are larger when behavior is measured over 3-year
rather than 1-year intervals. This is in contrast to some of the literature, which has found large
transitory responses to tax changes but smaller longer-term responses. With the richest set of
income controls, but with no allowance for adjacent-year income shifting, income-weighted ETI
estimates based on 1-year differencing range from 0 to 0.19. Similarly estimated elasticities over
3-year intervals are about 0.32 (and not sensitive to income cutoffs). The inclusion of adjacent-
year tax rates (to control for income shifting between years adjacent to each base and subsequent
year) results in much larger estimates, ranging from 0.30 to 0.43 for 1-year differences and from
40.97 to 1.37 for 3-year differences. However, among the four specifications that include separate
controls for mean reversion and income divergence, estimates range from 0.41 to 1.37. And
using the specification preferred by Gruber and Saez yields an estimated elasticity of 0.3
(compared to their estimate of 0.4 for the 1980s). In most cases, estimates from the end-year
approach are not statistically different from 0 for the 1990s, in contrast to estimates for the
1980s, where the same approach yields estimates ranging from 0.39 to 0.67.
While this paper provides insight into what methods may be more effective in accurately
identifying responses to changes in tax rates, the findings more broadly highlight the inherent
complexities in separating these responses from the myriad of other factors that influence
income. Incorporating more sophisticated controls for mean reversion and income divergence
may improve estimates, but reasonable a priori specification decisions can lead to a wide array of
estimates and thus little confidence should be placed on any single estimate.
II. The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993
The two major tax changes examined in this paper are the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation
Acts (OBRA) of 1990 and 1993. Both tax changes generally raised income tax rates on higher
income filers and left them unchanged for those in the lower brackets.
OBRA 90 raised both the marginal tax rate on top incomes (from 28 to 31 percent) and the
cap on wages subject to Social Security’s hospital insurance tax, which funds Medicare and
amounts to 2.9 percent when including both the employee and employer share (from $53,400 to
$125,000). Although OBRA 90 represented a major tax increase, it lowered marginal tax rates
5for filers in the so-called “bubble bracket” (prior to OBRA 90), who generally saw their marginal
income tax rate decline from 33 to 31 percent.1
OBRA 93 created two new high-income tax brackets, at rates of 36 and 39.6 percent, and
lifted the cap on wages and salaries subject to the Social Security hospital insurance cap. The
new tax brackets were retroactive and applied for 1993; the removal of the hospital insurance cap
took effect in 1994. The bill’s key provisions did not directly affect those in the lower tax
brackets.
III. Data and Methods
Data on individual tax returns for 1984, 1985, and 1988–95 are from the Statistics of Income
(SOI), a large sample of tax returns compiled by the Internal Revenue Service that includes all
information reported on filers’ tax returns as well as additional demographic information.
Constructing Three Samples
The analysis relies on three samples constructed from the SOI so as to conform to the three key
methodological variants. The main distinction between these variants is the time interval over
which individual-level behavior is examined (i.e., over 1-, 3-, or 6-year intervals). The approach
is presented in detail later in this section.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the three samples, which include only filers with
taxable income greater than $10,000 whose filing status did not change over the sample period.
The sample for the year-to-year analysis comprises 99,421 paired observations (14,203 filers)
and spans years 1989 to 1995. Mean taxable income (in 1992 dollars and adjusted by sampling
1 Before OBRA 90, those with incomes beyond the 33 percent bracket faced marginal tax rates of 28 percent. These
filers were moved to the 31 percent bracket after OBRA 90.
6weights) is $36,656 and mean gross income is $51,827. The sample is restricted to filers present
in every year from 1989 to 1995,2 but this restriction should not be particularly important as
observations in the regression analysis are weighted by the inverse of their probability of
appearing in the sample.
The other two samples are very similar to each other in their construction. The sample used
to measure responses over 3-year intervals includes base years (i.e., the first year of each
observation) 1989 to 1992, paired with subsequent years 1992 to 1995 (i.e., the second year of
each paired observation). The sample comparing end years examines responses between just
1989 and 1995. Both require that the filer be present only in the base and subsequent year, not
every year from 1989 to 1995. The sample used to measure responses over 3-year intervals
comprises 157,083 paired observations. Mean taxable income is $34,877 and gross income
$55,749 (in 1992 dollars and adjusted by sampling weights). The sample for examining behavior
between end years has 31,142 paired observations, with a mean taxable income of $41,360 and
gross income of $60,047 (in 1992 dollars and adjusted by sampling weights). For comparison,
data for 37,673 filers3 in 1985–89 are used to estimate elasticities of taxable income (ETIs) for
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86).
Econometric Approach
The methodology focuses on individual-level changes in income (i.e., first differences) measured
over 1-, 3-, and 6-year intervals. The following equation is estimated via two-stage least squares:
2 Filers in each sample must also be present in 1988 because data from this year are used in constructing the
independent variables.
3 Auten and Carroll (1999 also employ a variation of this approach using similar data for 1985 and 1989. Their
control variables and income restrictions are not the same, however.
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The dependent variable is the log of income in a subsequent year )( stincome divided by income
in the base year (incomet), where the subsequent year is 1, 3, or 6 years after the base. The key
independent variable equals the log of the net-of-tax rate (NTR) in the same subsequent
year )1( stτ− divided by the NTR in the base year (1 – τt).5 To avoid endogeneity between the tax
rate and income, an instrument is included for the actual log change in the NTR. The coefficient
on that variable, ξ, represents the ETI. In addition the analyses include year fixed-effects plus
demographic information (X), including age, gender, and marital and itemization status.
Functions of income in the base year and the year prior (f(incomet, incomet−1)) are included in
order to control for two of the most vexing obstacles to identification, mean reversion and non-
tax-related divergence in the income distribution.
Finally, in examinations of year-to-year responses, the explanatory variables include both a
1-year lag and a 1-year lead in the log change in the NTR, in addition to the log change itself.
The lag is intended to account for income shifting resulting from a change in tax rates in the
previous year; such shifting could affect base-year income and, if not accounted for, could bias
elasticities estimates associated with the change in the NTR from the base to subsequent year.6
Analogously, the lead is intended to account for income shifting between the later year of each
paired observation and the year after (recall that in the 1990s, marginal tax rates increased for
some taxpayers in both 1993 and 1994).
4 For simplicity, the equation omits subscripts denoting the individual.
5 In addition, Gruber and Saez (2002) include a variable to separate the income effect from the substitution effect.
They conclude that the income effect is not important and thus exclude it from most of their analysis.
6 This issue should not be a problem with the end-year approach because the two years chosen are either well before
or well after the tax changes. It could however be an issue when examining 3-year differences.
8The lag is potentially important if the NTR falls from the year prior to the base, as
individuals may shift income from the base year to the preceding year, making base-year income
smaller than otherwise. If rates also change from the base to the subsequent year, this shifting
could overstate the tax response.7
Likewise, the leading rate is potentially important if the NTR falls between the year
subsequent to the base and the following year, inducing individuals to shift income from the year
following the subsequent year to the subsequent year, making income in the subsequent year
larger than otherwise. Additionally, if rates do not change between the base and subsequent year,
exclusion of the leading and lagged rate changes could bias the counterfactual income trend,
which could in turn bias ETI estimates.
Two different income measures are examined. The first measure is gross income, where
gross income = total income – adjustments8 – capital gains – supplemental (Schedule E)
income or loss + dividends excluded from AGI + unemployment compensation not
included in AGI + Keogh and traditional IRA contributions + forfeited interest penalties
+ alimony paid.
The second income measure is taxable income, which equals gross income less exemptions
and the greater of the standard or itemized deductions. As with most of the studies in this
literature, capital gains are excluded from the analysis because they are observed only when they
are realized, not when they accrue. Social Security benefits are excluded because they are not
fully observed in all years.
7 Here and in the following paragraph income shifting is discussed with respect to a falling NTR. The analysis is the
same for an increasing NTR, except that income would be moving (i.e., shifting) in the opposite direction.
8 Adjustments (e.g., certain education expenses, student loan interest, and contributions to traditional IRAs) are
subtracted from total income to calculate AGI.
9Income measures are defined according to 1990 law and adjusted by growth in gross income,
with 1992 as the point of reference.9 Over time, both tax rates and the definition of taxable
income itself change—for example, deductions and exemptions permitted in some years are not
allowed in others; the definition of income can affect responses to changes in tax rates (Slemrod
and Kopczuk 2002). Additionally, Heim (2007) shows that changes to allowable exclusions and
deductions can bias estimates, even when using a constant law definition of taxable income,
unless the cross-price elasticities between activities whose tax status has changed and those for
which it has not are zero or are known and taken into account.
The interval over which behavior is measured could have implications for the size of
responses. The year-to-year analysis is likely to capture transitory behavior, in addition to the
beginnings of a longer-term shift in behavior. Some analysts have found very large short-term
responses.10 Examining behavior over 3-year intervals is intended to capture longer-term (or
permanent) responses. In practice, however, shifting as a result of tax rate changes in years
adjacent to the years used in differencing could bias this estimate. The end-year approach is
intended to focus exclusively on permanent responses, avoiding potential biases resulting from
shifting between years adjacent to the two years used in creating each paired observation. That
is, the years used for the end-year analysis are chosen so that they are more than a year prior to
the tax change takes effect and more than a year after it is fully phased in. However, the use of
end years excludes some potentially valuable sources of variation. For example, data on income
changes for other pairs of years (in which tax rates did not change) may be helpful in
9 The adjustment for gross-income growth is analogous to adjustments that transform nominal dollars into real
dollars. Thus, for this paper, each individual's reported income is multiplied by the ratio of average gross income in
1990 over the average gross income in the year of the observation.
10 With respect to the 1990s, see Sammartino and Weiner (1997) and Goolsbee (2000).
10
constructing counterfactual income trends (i.e., absent a tax change), which is necessary for
identifying the true tax response.
The alternative controls11 for mean reversion and heterogeneous income trends across the
income distribution are a major focus of the following discussion. In addition to a specification
with no income controls, six alternatives are explored where f(incomet, incomet−1) in equation (1)
represents the different control variables shown in Table 2. Existing evidence supports both the
presence of both heterogeneous income trends and mean reversion. It also suggests that these
phenomena are large and, if not accounted for, could overwhelm tax responses.
Alternatives A and B include controls for either (A) income in the base year or (B) income in
the year before the base and the change in income from the year preceding the base. Alternative
B has the advantage over A because it includes separate controls for mean reversion and for
divergence in the income distribution. However, both alternatives are likely insufficient because
they allow only for a linear relationship between nontax factors and income growth. The
Congressional Budget Office (2001), Piketty and Saez (2003), and others show heterogeneous
rates of income growth across the income distribution during the past few decades (including the
1990s). Growth rates are much greater (and more volatile) at the very top of the income
distribution and do not increase linearly with income. This peculiarity in the evolution of the
income distribution has greatly reduced the efficacy of some otherwise sound econometric
techniques (such as differences-in-differences). Diverging income trends suggest that income
growth for a group not experiencing a tax change may be a poor counterfactual for another group
that is experiencing a tax change. And the jaggedness of these diverging trends suggests that an
11 Alternatives A and C are the same as those used by Gruber and Saez (2002); Kopczuk (2005) used alternatives B
and D through F. Both studies focused on the 1980s.
11
assumption that a group facing a tax change would have experienced income growth similar to
what they experienced in years when taxes did not change may also be specious.
In the 1990s, when the NTR was generally falling, imposing a linear control for income
growth due to nontax factors (i.e., a nonlinear phenomena) would likely attribute too little of the
income growth at the top of the distribution to nontax factors. Because those at the top of the
distribution are a driving force behind the overall response, linear controls, by overestimating the
counterfactual income trend at the top, likely underestimate the effect of rising marginal tax rates
on taxable income.
Alternatives C through F will likely do a better job because they include at least one
nonlinear component (i.e., a 10-piece spline) that allows for non-tax-related income changes that
vary by income decile. Alternative F has the greatest likelihood of adequately controlling for the
nontax effects because it includes separate and nonlinear controls for both mean reversion and
divergence in the income distribution. It is unlikely that just one variable could adequately
account for these two phenomena (see Kopczuk 2005).
The richest specification (alternative F) for the year-to-year approach can be written such
that
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where ξ1 and ξ2 represent the coefficients for the lagged and lead changes in the NTR,
respectively. For analyses of behavior over the other two intervals, the lead and lag coefficients
are excluded and the full specification can be written such that
12
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For the end-year approach, lead and lagged rate changes are likely unimportant because the
two years are chosen such that rates generally are not changing in adjacent years. But for
examinations of behavior over 3-year intervals, the lead and lagged tax rates could be important
for both the base year and the subsequent year. However, including these covariates would
require a new sample that included only filers that appear in all of these adjacent years.
In addition to these controls, each specification is estimated after imposing income floors of
$10,000, $30,000, and $50,000 on the base year of each paired observation (imposing the floor
on both the base and subsequent year could introduce bias, since some near the threshold would
be included in the sample if their income rose but excluded if it fell). The restrictions are
imposed to test whether the other variables adequately control for mean reversion at the bottom
of the income distribution. Because the tax changes target upper-income filers, these floors are
unlikely to exclude those experiencing a federal tax change, but they will alter the sample of
filers used to identify counterfactual behavior (absent a tax change).12 Mean reversion is
especially pronounced at the tails of the distribution. People at the high end of the income
distribution are often not there for extended periods and will probably have a substantial drop in
income that is unrelated to tax policy. At the other extreme, students often have a large increase
in income when they enter the workforce. Estimating the ETI without fully controlling for mean
reversion will result in a spurious correlation between non-tax-related increases (by people below
12 The income cutoffs are based on gross income in 1992 dollars. The $10,000 cutoff is similar to the restriction
imposed by Gruber and Saez (2002), the $30,000 cutoff is similar to that used by Auten and Carroll (1999), and the
$50,000 cutoff is similar to that used by Carroll (1998).
13
their lifetime path) and decreases (by those above their lifetime path) in taxable income as
responses to changes in tax rates.
Tax Rate Imputations and Instruments
Individual marginal tax rates are imputed using the CBO’s internal tax calculators. Only federal
rates are imputed for the year-to-year sample; for the other two samples, both federal and state
rates are imputed.13 For the year-to-year sample, an instrument for the NTR is created by
applying the tax schedule in each year to average income for years 1989 to 1995. For the other
two samples, the tax rate instrument is constructed by inflating base-year income by the growth
in mean gross income over the (either 3- or 6-year) interval between the base and subsequent
year. Next, the tax calculator computes counterfactual tax rates based on the inflated income
measure.
For the year-to-year sample, the mean federal marginal tax rate is 24.1 percent, for the
sample focused on 3-year intervals the rate is 23.6 percent, and when including state rates the
mean is 28 percent. For the end-year sample, the corresponding rates are 24.6 percent for federal
taxes and 29.1 percent overall.
Income Weighting
Income weighting places much more emphasis on responses at the top of the income distribution
and is designed to yield results that are indicative of the overall income response (and tax
revenue implications) resulting from a change in tax rates. If responses do not vary by income,
then weighting will not affect ETI estimates. However, research consistently finds that estimated
13 For information on CBO’s state tax calculator, see Bakija (2006).
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ETIs rise with income14; thus a single overall elasticity is not applicable when considering the
impact of rate changes that target only part of the income distribution or for rate changes that
differ across the distribution. In addition, a meaningful average overall ETI must take into
account the correlation between income and elasticities.
Sample Weighting
While some of the regressions are weighted by income, all are weighted to adjust for the SOI’s
nonrandom sampling properties. Selection into the SOI is conditional on several factors,
including income. Sampling probabilities reach 100 percent for very high income filers. In
addition, filers sampled once are sampled in all subsequent years if their income increases (and
other characteristics, such as filing status, do not change). In fact, the probability that a filer is
observed in two different years is simply the minimum of the sampling probabilities for the two
years. Without weighting, the sampling strategy raises the potential for spurious correlation
between the dependent variable ))/(ln( tt incomeincome s and the independent variables, including
the tax variable. To avoid that possibility, (paired) observations from the full SOI are weighted
by the reciprocal of their probability of appearing in the sample. That strategy is discussed in
Auten and Carroll (1999), who also employ the strategy using SOI data.15
IV. Results
14 People with higher incomes generally have more opportunities to respond to tax changes (see Saez 2004). They
generally itemize their tax returns, rely less on wage and salary income, and have more control over the timing and
sources of their income than do other groups. People with more modest incomes can change their labor supply or
alter the degree to which they use certain deductions and exemptions, but likely have relatively few alternatives to
alter their taxable income.
15 Income-weighted results are produced by simply multiplying income by the weights used to adjust for the SOI’s
nonrandom properties.
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Table 3 presents income-weighted ETI estimates and standard errors for each of the
specifications without allowing for income shifting between years adjacent to the years used to
construct each paired observation. Using the richest set of income controls (i.e., specification F,
which includes two 10-piece splines) and imposing a $50,000 income cutoff yields income-
weighted estimated ETIs ranging from 0.33 (measuring responses over 3-year intervals) to 0.19
(measuring year-to-year responses). The corresponding estimate for the end-year approach is
0.34, although that estimate is not statistically different from 0. A comparison of estimates over
1- and 3-year intervals suggests that the longer-term responses to the 1990s tax increases were
substantially larger than transitory responses.16 Additionally and for comparison, Panel 4 of
Table 3 presents estimates using years 1985 and 1989, the same years used by Auten and Carroll
(1999).
Table 4 is constructed in the same manner as Table 3, but estimates are based on
specifications that included adjacent-year rate changes. Tables 5 and 6 are analogous to Tables 3
and 4, except that the dependent variable is based on differences in gross income rather than
taxable income. Those tables present only estimated coefficients (i.e., elasticities) and standard
errors for the key dependent variable.
Results from Year-to-Year Differencing
Income-weighted estimates are smaller when using year-to-year differences as opposed to the
other intervals examined. Panel 1 of Table 3 reports estimates for 1-year differencing. With the
richest set of controls (specification F), the estimated ETIs increase with the income cutoff from
0 to 0.19 (also see Table 4). (Although not shown, raising the income cutoff to $75,000 also
16 This finding contrasts with the findings of Sammartino and Weiner (1997) and Goolsbee (2000) who, also for the
16
leaves the estimated ETI at about 0.2.) With the $50,000 income cutoff, the estimated ETI is
−0.18 when employing the Gruber and Saez preferred set of controls. However, the four
specifications that include separate controls for mean reversion and divergence in the income
distribution all yield estimated ETIs of about 0.19.
Table 4 presents estimates for differencing based on 1- and 3-year intervals and, in addition
to the log change in the NTR, with a 1-year lag and 1-year lead in this log change. The estimated
coefficients on the lagged rate change (when including the richest set of income controls) range
from 0.30 to 0.43. By comparison, including the lagged and lead rates with the controls favored
by Gruber and Saez (i.e., specification C) results in estimated ETIs that are modestly negative
and not statistically different from 0. Note that the estimated coefficients on the lagged and lead
change in tax rates are not part of the elasticity estimate because they are not part of the
concurrent change in tax rates. These variables are included solely because these factors could
influence base- or subsequent-year income, and in turn the dependent variable. Because the years
for the lagged and leading tax changes are not endogenous, they are included without
instruments. Income shifting due to the actual lagged and lead changes in tax rates should be
taken into account, even if the change in the lagged or lead rate is due to changes in behavior and
not to a change in statute. In addition to their effect on the estimated ETIs, the estimates on the
lagged and lead NTR coefficients (sometimes in excess of 1) suggest that these variables are
important. Note that, if the lag and lead were instrumented to contain only variation resulting
from changes in statute, the estimated coefficients should be negative (or zero), since a higher
NTR in an adjacent period should induce filers to shift income from the current period to the
adjacent. However, without instruments, the predicted sign on these coefficients is ambiguous,
1990s tax changes, find evidence of large transitory shifting.
17
since in response to a legislated drop in the NTR a filer could work less, falling into a lower
actual tax bracket.
With a $50,000 income cutoff, estimates from the four specifications that include separate
controls for mean reversion (specifications B, D, E, and F from Table 4 Panel 1) are very similar,
ranging from 0.38 to 0.44. These estimates, when including both sets of income controls, are
within the 0.38–0.56 range reported by Carroll (1998) (also using year-to-year differences for the
same time period). However, Carroll does not weight estimates by income or control for
adjacent-year rate changes, and his estimates are larger than my person-weighted estimates (see
Appendix Table A1).17
Turning to gross income, estimated elasticities are smaller with the richest set of controls,
ranging from 0.14 to 0.17, depending on the income cutoff and the use (or not) of adjacent-year
controls (see Tables 5 and 6). Without the adjacent-year controls, estimates are small and not
statistically different from 0. The fact that the estimates are smaller than the corresponding
estimates for taxable income likely reflects the fact that gross income is a broader measure and
thus there are fewer opportunities to shift income outside this base. Additionally, the
denominator for the gross income elasticity is larger. Thus, for an equivalent income response,
the elasticity will be smaller for gross income than for taxable income. In examinations of
behavior over 1-year intervals, Heim (2007) and Carroll (1998) also find somewhat smaller
estimated elasticities when looking at broader income measures.
Results from Differencing by 3-Year Intervals
17 Carroll (1998) does not include any nonlinear income controls, but does include industry and occupation
dummies.
18
With the richest set of income controls, estimated ETIs resulting from 3-year differencing are
about 0.33 and the income cutoff has virtually no effect on the estimate (see Table 3 Panel 2,
specification F). For most of the other specifications, ETI estimates rise with the income cutoff.
Including a spline of the log of income in (t – 1) and the difference in the logs of base-year
income and the income in (t – 1) yields similar results, with ETI estimates ranging from 0.34 to
0.38. For the other specifications, estimates are much more sensitive to income cutoffs. Gruber
and Saez’s preferred specification (C) yields estimates from 0.30 with a $10,000 income cutoff
to 0.54 with a $50,000 income cutoff.
My estimates, when including both sets of nonlinear income controls, are larger than
corresponding estimates, ranging from 0.19 to 0.26 (Giertz 2007), and smaller than the estimates
of 0.53 to 0.58 reported by Heim (2007).18 Those other estimates are also weighted by income,
based on 1990s tax data and on responses over 3-year intervals.19
As with his year-to-year analysis, Heim’s primary nonlinear income control is based on
average income. When subject to the same income controls used in this analysis (i.e., 10-piece
splines of both lagged income and the difference between base-year and lagged income), Heim’s
estimated ETIs are negative and not statistically significant. And after dropping years 1987 and
1988, his estimated ETIs of 0.53 and 0.58 jump to 1.37 and 1.58, respectively.
Table 4 Panel 2 presents estimates based on 3-year differences that, in addition to the log
change in the NTR, include a 1-year lag and 1-year lead in this log change. When including the
18Heim’s estimates, when examining behavior over 3-year intervals, are slightly larger than his corresponding
estimates when using a year-to-year analysis. By contrast, this paper reports substantially larger responses with a
year-to-year analysis (as opposed to analyzing behavior over 3-year intervals).
19 Similar analyses in Gruber and Saez (2002), Kopczuk (2005), and Giertz (2007) suggest an overall income-
weighted ETI of around 0.40 for the 1980s, but these estimates are often quite sensitive to a number of factors.
When taking into account the broadening of the tax base in the 1980s, Kopczuk reports an estimated ETI of about
0.30. And in Giertz (2007), when including both sets of nonlinear income controls, I reported an income-weighted
estimated ETI of 0.35 for the 1980s and 1990s combined.
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adjacent-year controls, the estimated elasticities (with the richest set of income controls) are now
much larger, ranging from 1.37 to 0.98—and falling with the income cutoff. For the other three
specifications that include separate controls for mean reversion and divergence in the income
distribution (i.e., specifications B, D, and E), estimated ETIs range from 0.41 to 1.42. By
comparison, including the lagged and lead rates with the controls favored by Gruber and Saez
(specification C) results in estimated ETIs that increase with the income cutoff from 0.47 to 0.73.
Heim’s ETI estimates, when controlling for changes in tax rates in years adjacent to each base
year, are even larger than mine, ranging from 1.35 to 1.47.
Elasticities estimated with no income controls are substantially larger than those estimated
using both sets of nonlinear controls (see the first column of estimates in Table 3 Panel 2). The
much larger estimates without income controls suggest that mean reversion at the top of the
income distribution dominates the secular increase in income, also at the top.20 In a period such
as the early 1990s, falling incomes (due to mean reversion) at the top of the income distribution
are directly but spuriously correlated with an also falling NTR. Without income controls, at least
a portion of that spurious correlation will be reflected in the estimated ETI. By contrast, in a
period when the NTR is rising, such as the 1980s, that spurious correlation should bias estimates
downward because the falling incomes at the top are inversely correlated with the rise in the
NTR. In fact, this is exactly what I report when comparing estimates (over 3-year intervals) for
the 1980s with those for the 1990s (Giertz 2007).
Turning to gross income, estimated elasticities are, in contrast to the analysis based on year-
to-year differences, larger than corresponding estimates for taxable income (see Table 5 Panel 2).
Gross income elasticities, when including both sets of nonlinear income controls, rise with the
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income cutoff from 0.19 to 0.30. By comparison, Heim’s preferred estimate, using a broader
measure of income (and examining responses over 3-year intervals), is about 0.46, whereas my
preferred estimate for the 1990s is 0.13 (Giertz 2007). Again, when including adjacent year
controls, gross income elasticities are much larger.
Results from Comparing End Years
Aside from the robustness of the estimates, do the estimates capture longer-term behavioral
responses, as opposed to shorter-term income shifting? As noted earlier, comparing adjacent
years may yield estimates that reflect transitory responses more than they do fundamental shifts
in behavior, and these two can be very different. For example, Goolsbee (2000), examining the
behavior of high-paid executives, finds very large transitory responses to the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993) but only modest longer-term responses. One way to
focus exclusively on longer-term responses is to compare behavior a couple of years before a tax
change to behavior a couple of years afterward. Auten and Carroll (1999) used that approach to
examine responses to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
When employing the richest set of controls, the end-year approach, which includes years
1989 and 1995, yields estimated ETIs ranging from 0.34 to 0.47, depending on the income cutoff
(see Table 3 Panel 3, specification F). However, estimates from this approach are rarely
statistically different from 0. (With a $50,000 income cutoff, specification C, preferred by
Gruber and Saez, yields a statistically insignificant ETI estimate of 0.47.) It appears that with just
one set of paired observations, the absence of paired observations for higher income filers over a
similar period when their tax rates did not change may greatly diminish the model’s ability to
20 Note that very few middle-income filers will move to the very top of the income distribution. But incomes for
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identify counterfactual income trends. Furthermore, the inclusion of nonlinear functions of
income, which are necessary to account for widening inequality at the top of the income
distribution, makes identification all the more difficult since the instrumented tax rate is also a
nonlinear function of income.21
For comparison, the end-year analysis is repeated for TRA 86, using years 1985 and 1989. In
contrast to the estimates for the early 1990s, the 1980s estimates are often statistically
significant. With the most comprehensive set of income controls (specification F), income-
weighted estimates range from 0.39, with a $10,000 income cutoff, to 0.67, with a $50,000
income cutoff (see Table 3 Panel 4). (The other three specifications that include at least one
nonlinear income control yield estimates ranging from 0.41 to 0.97, depending on the income
cutoff.) It is not clear why estimated coefficients for the 1980s show strong statistical
significance whereas the 1990s estimates do not. One possibility is that TRA 86 changed tax
rates for a much larger share of the sample and by differing amounts, thus there is more cross-
sectional variation in rates for the TRA 86 analysis than for the 1990s.
Income Cutoffs
Because the 1990 and 1993 tax increases targeted upper-income filers, many filers experienced
no statutory change in federal tax rates over period. Lower-income filers serve to identify the
non-tax-related income trend, but only to the extent that these trends are similar across income
groups. Income growth during the period was slower for low-income groups than for higher-
income groups. Thus, as the income cutoff for inclusion in the sample increases, the estimated
counterfactual income trend (i.e., the trend absent any changes in tax law) may rise. If that
most of those at the very top of the distribution will eventually fall to more moderate levels (independent of taxes).
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phenomenon dominates, then raising the income cutoff over a period when tax rates were rising
(i.e., when the NTR was falling), as in the first half of the 1990s, would increase elasticity
estimates (as Carroll found when moving from a $50,000 to $75,000 cutoff). On the other hand,
mean reversion may also be strong for lower-income filers. For the 1990s, the impact of mean
reversion at the bottom of the distribution would have the opposite effect on estimated ETIs,
lowering the estimates.
The analysis presented in this paper shows that, when not controlling for adjacent-year tax
rate changes, estimates for the year-to-year approach are not particularly sensitive to the income
cutoff. When comparing behavior over 3-year intervals, it appears that mean reversion at the
bottom of the distribution tends to bias estimates downward. That is, when differencing over 3-
year intervals, many of the specifications produce larger ETI estimates as the income cutoff is
raised. This is also true of the end-year approach; however, estimates from that approach are
generally not statistically significant. When adding adjacent-year income controls, the pattern is
different: 1-year differencing results in ETI estimates that generally increase with the income
cutoff, while 3-year differencing yields estimated ETIs that often fall as the income cutoff is
raised.
V. Conclusion
This paper presents the results of variations of a differencing methodology applied to panels of
Internal Revenue Service tax return data for the 1990s in order to estimate the responsiveness of
taxable (and gross) income to changes in tax rates. In addition to varying the time interval over
which behavior is measured, sensitivity tests explored different combinations of control variables
as well as alternative weighting strategies and sample selection criteria. While many of the
21 Gross income elasticities too are not statistically different from 0 using the end-year approach.
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estimates are in line with the wide range found in the recent literature, they are often quite
sensitive to factors such as specification, time period analyzed, and sample income cutoffs.
In general, income-weighted estimates are larger when behavior is measured over 3-year
intervals as opposed to 1-year intervals. This is in contrast to some reports of large transitory
responses to tax changes but smaller longer-term responses. When including the richest set of
income controls, but not allowing for adjacent-year income shifting, income-weighted ETI
estimates based on 1-year differencing range from 0 to 0.19. Similarly estimated elasticities over
3-year intervals are about 0.32 (and not sensitive to income cutoffs). The inclusion of adjacent-
year tax rates to control for income shifting between years adjacent to each base and subsequent
year results in much larger estimates. Estimates based on 1-year differencing now range from
0.30 to 0.43, and those for 3-year intervals range from 0.97 to 1.37. However, among the four
specifications that include separate controls for mean reversion and income divergence, estimates
range from 0.41 to 1.37. Estimates from the end-year approach vary in magnitude, but are
generally not statistically different from 0, suggesting that, at least for this period, there is not
enough variation to identify responses with just 2 years of data.
The findings in this paper show that, for the 1990s, the use of separate controls for income
divergence and mean reversion tends to yield more robust estimates. Additionally, when
including the richest set of income controls, estimated ETIs for the 1990s are similar to recent
estimates for the 1980s, although generally much smaller than reported in some of the earlier
studies that examined that period. Other specifications (most of which exclude either separate
controls for mean reversion and divergence in the income distribution or a nonlinear income
control) often yield very different results and are usually much more sensitive to income cutoffs.
The inclusion of a 10-piece spline of logged base-year income as the sole income control, for
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example, yields estimated ETIs that are substantially negative when measuring behavior over 1-
year intervals.
While more sophisticated control variables sometimes yield more robust estimates, estimates
are still sensitive to reasonable a priori specification decisions. This reflects the inherent
complexity of separating responses to changes in tax rates from the many other factors that also
influence income. Divergence in the income distribution remains one of the most intransigent
obstacles to correctly identifying the ETI. The fact that the divergence in incomes has persisted
through periods of both increases and decreases in the level and progressivity of tax rates
suggests that it is, in large part, not a direct response to tax changes. However, the possibility that
the phenomenon results from a longer-run and more nuanced response to the lowering of
marginal tax rates on top income since World War II cannot be ruled out.22
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Year-to-
Year
3-year
Intervals
End
Years
Paired Observationsa 99,421 157,083 31,142
Differencing: Years between Base
and Subsequent Observations 1 3 6
Returns with Base Year Taxable Income Greater than:
$1,000,000 7,006 26,128 6,013
$5,000,000 1,822 5,775 1,456
Mean Taxable Incomeb $36,566 $34,877 $41,360
Mean Gross Incomeb $51,827 $55,749 $60,047
Mean Federal Tax Rate 24.1 23.6 24.6
Mean State Tax Rate 4.8 4.4 4.5
Mean Net-of-Tax Rate 71.1 72.0 70.9
Source: Calculations based on Statistics of Income data from 1989 to 1995.
a. Sample sizes are based on $30,000 income cutoff, but do not include the full set
of restrictions used for the regression analysis. The year-to-year sample excludes
filers who are not observed every year.
b. Incomes are expressed in 1992 dollars, adjusted by the growth in gross income.
Table 2. Alternative Sets of Control Variables
A The log of base-year income )ln( tincome
B The log of income in the year before the base year
and the difference in logs between base-year income
and that of the year prior






−
−
1
1 lnand)ln(
t
t
t income
income
income
C A 10-piece spline of the log of base-year income )ln(ofsplinepiece-10 tincome
D A 10-piece spline of the log of income in the year
before the base year and the difference in logs
between base-year income and that of the year prior






−
−
1
1 lnand)ln(ofsplinepiece-10
t
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E The log of income in the year before the base year
and a 10-piece spline of the difference in logs
between base-year income and that of the year prior
)ln(andlnofsplinepiece-10 1
1
−
−




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
t
t
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F A 10-piece spline of the log of income in the year
before the base year and a 10-piece spline of the
difference in logs between base-year income and that
of the year prior






−
−
1
1 lnand)ln(bothofsplinespiece-10
t
t
t income
income
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Table 3. Income-Weighted ETI Estimates without Adjacent-Year MTRs: 1989-95
Income
Cutoff none A B C D E F
year-to-year
Panel 1 $10k -0.014 -0.342 -0.026 -0.141 0.007 -0.023 0.000
(0.079) (0.081) (0.073) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075)
$30k 0.114 -0.241 0.127 -0.106 0.152 0.130 0.145
(0.067) (0.065) (0.073) (0.061) (0.075) (0.073) (0.075)
$50k 0.204 -0.255 0.186 -0.177 0.194 0.188 0.188
(0.081) (0.076) (0.089) (0.075) (0.091) (0.089) (0.091)
3-year intervals
Panel 2 $10k 1.409 -0.025 -0.015 0.3 0.36 -0.052 0.314
(0.130) (0.097) (0.103) (0.131) (0.125) (0.102) (0.123)
$30k 1.506 0.136 0.13 0.415 0.377 0.079 0.319
(0.138) (0.113) (0.119) (0.153) (0.137) (0.117) (0.136)
$50k 1.574 0.206 0.22 0.543 0.344 0.196 0.328
(0.144) (0.152) (0.159) (0.182) (0.165) (0.154) (0.163)
end years 1989 to 1995
Panel 3 $10k 1.803 -0.059 -0.063 0.424 0.451 -0.037 0.436
(0.278) (0.167) (0.177) (0.264) (0.255) (0.179) (0.253)
$30k 1.818 0.147 0.143 0.468 0.491 0.143 0.474
(0.292) (0.191) (0.202) (0.306) (0.261) (0.203) (0.258)
$50k 1.783 0.2 0.172 0.474 0.342 0.164 0.342
(0.292) (0.266) (0.261) (0.340) (0.289) (0.259) (0.288)
end years 1985 to 1989
Panel 4 $10k -0.166 0.992 0.34 0.966 0.406 0.885 0.387
(0.093) (0.153) (0.180) (0.162) (0.166) (0.164) (0.165)
$30k -0.032 0.775 0.35 0.777 0.422 0.763 0.431
(0.100) (0.170) (0.190) (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.173)
$50k -0.029 0.63 0.376 0.69 0.684 0.734 0.665
(0.115) (0.223) (0.235) (0.211) (0.231) (0.210) (0.219)
Source: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1989 to 1995.
Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see
Section III). Robust standard errors, clustered by tax filer, are in parentheses.
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Table 4. Income-Weighted ETI Estimates with Adjacent-Year MTRs: 1989-95
Income
Cutoff none A B C D E F
year-to-year
Panel 1 $10k 0.367 -0.222 0.200 -0.109 0.314 0.200 0.299
(0.079) (0.109) (0.087) (0.122) (0.095) (0.087) (0.094)
$30k 0.570 -0.059 0.342 0.030 0.433 0.342 0.418
(0.077) (0.094) (0.087) (0.099) (0.094) (0.087) (0.094)
$50k 0.668 -0.081 0.378 -0.036 0.436 0.378 0.425
(0.090) (0.108) (0.105) (0.111) (0.112) (0.105) (0.112)
3-year intervals
Panel 2 $10k 1.867 0.466 0.466 1.221 1.422 0.410 1.371
(0.141) (0.189) (0.184) (0.249) (0.255) (0.188) (0.249)
$30k 1.891 0.777 0.707 1.315 1.352 0.633 1.286
(0.146) (0.243) (0.227) (0.277) (0.278) (0.226) (0.270)
$50k 1.783 0.737 0.728 1.106 0.993 0.682 0.975
(0.151) (0.357) (0.320) (0.312) (0.317) (0.313) (0.304)
Source: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1989 to 1995.
Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see
Section III). Robust standard errors, clustered by tax filer, are in parentheses.
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Table 5. Income-Weighted Gross Income Elasticity Estimates without Adjacent-Year MTRs: 1989-95
Income
Cutoff none A B C D E F
year-to-year
Panel 1 $10k -0.011 -0.166 -0.071 -0.102 -0.019 -0.079 -0.022
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.057) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
$30k 0.013 -0.134 0.034 -0.107 0.062 0.026 0.056
(0.044) (0.044) (0.056) (0.043) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057)
$50k 0.067 -0.146 0.055 -0.127 0.073 0.044 0.063
(0.053) (0.056) (0.070) (0.057) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071)
3-year intervals
Panel 2 $10k 1.035 0.13 0.105 0.171 0.216 0.072 0.189
(0.086) (0.063) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068)
$30k 1.293 0.213 0.214 0.291 0.287 0.188 0.256
(0.111) (0.090) (0.095) (0.105) (0.101) (0.093) (0.100)
$50k 1.376 0.259 0.238 0.392 0.278 0.257 0.295
(0.119) (0.121) (0.124) (0.128) (0.123) (0.122) (0.123)
end years 1989 to 1995
Panel 3 $10k 1.254 0.285 -0.001 0.171 0.142 -0.02 0.141
(0.165) (0.115) (0.102) (0.134) (0.125) (0.101) (0.123)
$30k 1.456 0.267 0.121 0.355 0.223 0.108 0.225
(0.198) (0.130) (0.142) (0.215) (0.177) (0.142) (0.174)
$50k 1.494 0.278 0.265 0.55 0.324 0.306 0.356
(0.202) (0.178) (0.200) (0.260) (0.218) (0.197) (0.217)
end years 1985 to 1989
Panel 4 $10k -0.119 0.253 0.063 0.419 0.257 0.434 0.257
(0.069) (0.111) (0.155) (0.155) (0.148) (0.155) (0.147)
$30k 0.01 0.179 0.082 0.382 0.288 0.39 0.279
(0.082) (0.165) (0.171) (0.175) (0.171) (0.174) (0.167)
$50k 0.045 0.086 0.13 0.443 0.398 0.437 0.384
(0.104) (0.281) (0.227) (0.227) (0.237) (0.224) (0.229)
Source: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1989 to 1995.
Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income
(see Section III). Robust standard errors, clustered by tax filer, are in parentheses.
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Table 6. Income-Weighted Gross Income Elasticity Estimates with Adjacent-Year MTRs: 1989-95
Income
Cutoff none A B C D E F
year-to-year
Panel 1 $10k 0.222 -0.204 0.048 -0.108 0.144 0.040 0.141
(0.058) (0.074) (0.070) (0.080) (0.075) (0.070) (0.074)
$30k 0.326 -0.075 0.146 -0.035 0.201 0.135 0.193
(0.058) (0.071) (0.068) (0.074) (0.072) (0.067) (0.071)
$50k 0.387 -0.102 0.151 -0.079 0.187 0.137 0.174
(0.068) (0.082) (0.083) (0.086) (0.086) (0.082) (0.086)
3-year intervals
Panel 2 $10k 1.741 0.453 0.869 1.765 1.478 0.822 1.433
(0.138) (0.176) (0.126) (0.277) (0.162) (0.126) (0.157)
$30k 1.762 0.787 1.13 1.9 1.66 1.093 1.614
(0.143) (0.226) (0.188) (0.318) (0.241) (0.183) (0.233)
$50k 1.656 0.813 1.193 1.836 1.481 1.217 1.515
(0.148) (0.334) (0.262) (0.371) (0.291) (0.253) (0.281)
Source: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1989 to 1995.
Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income
(see Section III). Robust standard errors, clustered by tax filer, are in parentheses.
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Table 7. Income-Weighted ETI Estimates without Adjacent-Year MTRs
Income-Weighted ETI Estimates: 1989 to 1995
Interval Length 1-Year 3-Year 6-Year
E F E F E F
ln((1 - mtrt+s)/(1 - mtrt)) 0.682 0.975 0.196 0.328 0.164 0.342
(0.313) (0.304) (0.154) (0.163) (0.259) (0.288)
ln((1 - mtrt)/(1 - mtrt-1)) -0.495 -0.703
(0.125) (0.136)
ln((1 - mtrt+2)/(1 - mtrt+1)) 0.177 0.252
(0.107) (0.098)
ln(incomet-1)) -0.033 -0.057 -0.146
(0.019) (0.009) (0.026)
Single -0.020 -0.014 -0.035 -0.033 0.091 0.103
(0.045) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) (0.109) (0.109)
Joint Return 0.034 0.029 0.03 0.023 0.265 0.261
(0.043) (0.040) (0.038) (0.035) (0.104) (0.103)
Head of Household
Age 0.122 0.120 0.093 0.095 0.203 0.195
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.037)
Age Squared/10 -0.026 -0.025 -0.02 -0.02 -0.043 -0.042
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
Age Cubed/100 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.027 0.026
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Itemizer Dummy -0.125 -0.111 -0.122 -0.116 -0.168 -0.164
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.029)
ln(income t-1)*decile 1 -0.386 -0.410 -0.481 -0.53
(0.063) (0.068) (0.151) (0.225)
ln(income t-1)*decile 2 -0.332 -0.270 -0.731 -0.599
(0.111) (0.112) (0.211) (0.244)
ln(income t-1)*decile 3 -0.102 -0.018 -0.341 -0.652
(0.158) (0.161) (0.192) (0.188)
ln(income t-1)*decile 4 0.034 0.108 -0.274 -0.171
(0.250) (0.256) (0.095) (0.193)
ln(income t-1)*decile 5 -0.415 -0.334 -0.142 -0.271
(0.278) (0.284) (0.047) (0.122)
ln(income t-1)*decile 6 0.277 0.199 0.044 -0.015
(0.271) (0.277) (0.033) (0.092)
ln(income t-1)*decile 7 -0.817 -0.894 0.024 -0.087
(0.208) (0.210) (0.030) (0.066)
ln(income t-1)*decile 8 -0.178 -0.316 -0.1 -0.098
(0.159) (0.162) (0.035) (0.077)
ln(income t-1)*decile 9 -0.651 -0.604 -0.018 -0.034
(0.108) (0.117) (0.047) (0.094)
ln(income t-1)*decile 10 -0.432 -0.648 -0.159 -0.245
(0.083) (0.109) (0.033) (0.072)
ln((incomet)/(incomet-1))*decile 1 -0.490 -0.397 -0.407 -0.382 -0.356
(0.176) (0.050) (0.052) (0.148) (0.158)
ln((incomet)/(incomet-1))*decile 2 -0.743 -0.321 -0.269 -0.427 -0.336
(0.237) (0.099) (0.100) (0.201) (0.203)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 3 -0.363 -0.096 -0.04 -0.323 -0.236
(0.217) (0.150) (0.153) (0.394) (0.403)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 4 -0.460 -0.049 0.017 -0.268 -0.033
(0.116) (0.219) (0.222) (0.537) (0.544)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 5 -0.323 -0.345 -0.294 -0.205 -0.196
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(0.068) (0.256) (0.260) (0.575) (0.587)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 6 0.302 0.352 0.315 -0.662 -0.625
(0.082) (0.241) (0.245) (0.460) (0.469)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 7 -0.010 -0.86 -0.918 0.305 0.345
(0.030) (0.182) (0.185) (0.326) (0.330)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 8 -0.007 -0.207 -0.293 -0.644 -0.609
(0.042) (0.136) (0.140) (0.242) (0.262)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 9 -0.096 -0.609 -0.584 -0.208 -0.339
(0.045) (0.102) (0.117) (0.117) (0.161)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 10 -0.135 -0.422 -0.607 -0.260 -0.577
(0.037) (0.064) (0.094) (0.081) (0.232)
Constant -1.480 3.385 -0.784 3.585 -1.568 2.299
(0.332) (1.635) (0.241) (1.389) (0.650) (2.122)
Observations 47,096 47,096 78,778 78,778 15,594 15,594
R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06
Source: Estimates based on Statistics of Income data for years 1988 to 1995.
Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. The income range is $50,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by
the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see Section III). Robust standard errors, clustered by tax
filer, are in parentheses.
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Table 8. Income-Weighted ETI Estimates with Adjacent-Year MTRs
Income-Weighted ETI Estimates: 1989 to 1995
Interval Length 1-Year 3-Year
E F E F
ln((1 - mtrt+s)/(1 - mtrt)) 0.378 0.425 0.682 0.975
(0.105) (0.112) (0.313) (0.304)
ln((1 - mtrt)/(1 - mtrt-1)) 0.621 0.683 -0.495 -0.703
(0.086) (0.094) (0.125) (0.136)
ln((1 - mtrt+2)/(1 - mtrt+1)) 0.333 0.354 0.177 0.252
(0.107) (0.111) (0.107) (0.098)
ln(incomet-1) -0.029 -0.033
(0.005) (0.019)
Single -0.020 -0.014
(0.045) (0.042)
Joint Return 0.004 0.004 0.034 0.029
(0.009) (0.009) (0.043) (0.040)
Head of Household -0.010 -0.014
(0.024) (0.024)
Age 0.016 0.018 0.122 0.120
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
Age Squared/10 -0.003 -0.004 -0.026 -0.025
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age Cubed/100 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.016
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Itemizer Dummy 0.020 0.021 -0.125 -0.111
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
ln(income t-1)*decile 1 -0.036 -0.386 -0.410
(0.050) (0.063) (0.068)
ln(income t-1)*decile 2 -0.022 -0.332 -0.270
(0.048) (0.111) (0.112)
ln(income t-1)*decile 3 -0.066 -0.102 -0.018
(0.068) (0.158) (0.161)
ln(income t-1)*decile 4 -0.086 0.034 0.108
(0.085) (0.250) (0.256)
ln(income t-1)*decile 5 0.038 -0.415 -0.334
(0.079) (0.278) (0.284)
ln(income t-1)*decile 6 -0.171 0.277 0.199
(0.041) (0.271) (0.277)
ln(income t-1)*decile 7 -0.042 -0.817 -0.894
(0.022) (0.208) (0.210)
ln(income t-1)*decile 8 -0.037 -0.178 -0.316
(0.012) (0.159) (0.162)
ln(income t-1)*decile 9 0.002 -0.651 -0.604
(0.014) (0.108) (0.117)
ln(income t-1)*decile 10 -0.029 -0.432 -0.648
(0.015) (0.083) (0.109)
ln((incomet)/(incomet-1))*decile 1 -0.148 -0.146 -0.490
(0.043) (0.042) (0.176)
ln((incomet)/(incomet-1))*decile 2 -0.192 -0.183 -0.743
(0.068) (0.068) (0.237)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 3 -0.123 -0.120 -0.363
(0.082) (0.083) (0.217)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 4 -0.182 -0.165 -0.460
(0.092) (0.093) (0.116)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 5 0.060 0.057 -0.323
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(0.087) (0.088) (0.068)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 6 -0.147 -0.157 0.302
(0.065) (0.065) (0.082)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 7 -0.080 -0.084 -0.010
(0.052) (0.053) (0.030)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 8 -0.106 -0.110 -0.007
(0.043) (0.044) (0.042)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 9 -0.096 -0.105 -0.096
(0.032) (0.033) (0.045)
ln((incomet)/(income t-1))*decile 10 0.005 0.003 -0.135
(0.017) (0.019) (0.037)
Constant 0.126 0.196 -1.480 3.385
(0.163) (0.444) (0.332) (1.635)
Observations 44,438 44,438 64,554 64,554
R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07
Source: Estimates based on Statistics of Income data for years 1988 to 1995.
Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. The income range is $50,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by
the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see Section III). Robust standard errors, clustered by tax
filer, are in parentheses.
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Appendix Table A1. Person-Weighted ETI Estimates without Adjacent-Year MTRs: 1989-95
Income
Cutoff none A B C D E F
year-to-year
Panel 1 $10k 0.069 -2.904 -0.982 -0.696 0.113 -0.602 0.065
(0.380) (0.320) (0.314) (0.433) (0.516) (0.319) (0.497)
$30k 0.034 -2.751 -0.843 -1.148 -0.223 -0.543 -0.217
(0.331) (0.277) (0.271) (0.349) (0.410) (0.282) (0.407)
$50k 0.403 -2.085 -0.285 -1.02 0.234 -0.141 0.162
(0.223) (0.264) (0.206) (0.231) (0.279) (0.210) (0.273)
3-year intervals
Panel 2 $10k 0.251 -0.555 -0.46 -0.292 -0.247 -0.309 -0.198
(0.109) (0.098) (0.100) (0.102) (0.105) (0.098) (0.104)
$30k 0.377 -0.262 -0.229 0.012 0.031 -0.172 -0.01
(0.120) (0.106) (0.110) (0.135) (0.129) (0.111) (0.128)
$50k 0.756 -0.15 -0.045 0.181 0.092 -0.003 0.067
(0.127) (0.116) (0.124) (0.143) (0.135) (0.125) (0.134)
end years 1989 to 1995
Panel 3 $10k 1.408 -0.565 -0.857 -0.084 -0.488 -0.634 -0.408
(0.390) (0.154) (0.171) (0.178) (0.197) (0.185) (0.213)
$30k 0.889 -0.241 -0.291 0.084 0.062 -0.146 0.029
(0.260) (0.212) (0.245) (0.293) (0.302) (0.248) (0.301)
$50k 0.953 -0.382 -0.344 -0.024 -0.154 -0.138 -0.112
(0.245) (0.240) (0.284) (0.275) (0.306) (0.282) (0.300)
end years 1985 to 1989
Panel 4 $10k -2.099 1.328 0.318 1.131 0.572 0.753 0.297
(0.109) (0.155) (0.165) (0.180) (0.189) (0.166) (0.175)
$30k -0.34 0.747 0.178 0.728 0.262 0.667 0.314
(0.086) (0.141) (0.148) (0.164) (0.164) (0.160) (0.165)
$50k -0.156 0.822 0.169 0.879 0.717 0.792 0.633
(0.091) (0.181) (0.162) (0.211) (0.204) (0.198) (0.194)
Source: Estimates based on Statistics of Income data for years 1989 to 1995.
Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income
(see Section III). Robust standard errors, clustered by tax filer, are in parentheses.
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Appendix Table A2. Person-Weighted ETI Estimates with Adjacent-Year MTRs: 1989-95
Income
Cutoff none A B C D E F
year-to-year
Panel 1 $10k 0.375 -0.118 0.182 0.201 0.309 0.214 0.297
(0.105) (0.107) (0.102) (0.102) (0.105) (0.098) (0.102)
$30k 0.458 -0.024 0.255 0.173 0.350 0.278 0.339
(0.087) (0.090) (0.087) (0.085) (0.091) (0.085) (0.089)
$50k 0.477 -0.066 0.254 0.026 0.332 0.290 0.329
(0.096) (0.104) (0.094) (0.102) (0.098) (0.093) (0.097)
3-year intervals
Panel 2 $10k 0.763 -0.646 -0.319 0.234 0.279 0.023 0.468
(0.183) (0.166) (0.171) (0.180) (0.204) (0.172) (0.205)
$30k 1.463 0.264 0.292 1.004 0.955 0.405 0.937
(0.190) (0.194) (0.195) (0.246) (0.267) (0.199) (0.265)
$50k 1.406 0.337 0.453 0.825 0.738 0.522 0.705
(0.169) (0.269) (0.266) (0.251) (0.281) (0.274) (0.279)
end years 1989 to 1995
Panel 3 $10k 1.408 -0.565 -0.857 -0.084 -0.488 -0.634 -0.408
(0.390) (0.154) (0.171) (0.178) (0.197) (0.185) (0.213)
$30k 0.889 -0.241 -0.291 0.084 0.062 -0.146 0.029
(0.260) (0.212) (0.245) (0.293) (0.302) (0.248) (0.301)
$50k 0.953 -0.382 -0.344 -0.024 -0.154 -0.138 -0.112
(0.245) (0.240) (0.284) (0.275) (0.306) (0.282) (0.300)
end years 1985 to 1989
Panel 4 $10k -2.099 1.328 0.318 1.131 0.572 0.753 0.297
(0.109) (0.155) (0.165) (0.180) (0.189) (0.166) (0.175)
$30k -0.34 0.747 0.178 0.728 0.262 0.667 0.314
(0.086) (0.141) (0.148) (0.164) (0.164) (0.160) (0.165)
$50k -0.156 0.822 0.169 0.879 0.717 0.792 0.633
(0.091) (0.181) (0.162) (0.211) (0.204) (0.198) (0.194)
Source: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1989 to 1995.
Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income
(see Section III). Robust standard errors, clustered by tax filer, are in parentheses.
